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In May 2003, the State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project and the 
Centre for Conflict & Post-Conflict Studies 
Asia-Pacific hosted the Southern Highlands 
Province Workshop at the Australian National 
University. The workshop explored key issues in 
the Southern Highlands, the nature of conflict, 
the prospects for conflict transformation, and 
the possible roles for donors in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. This discussion paper 
by Laurence Goldman focuses on the Huli, 
their reasons for engaging in conflict and their 
strategies for conflict resolution. A full report 
on the workshop may be accessed at http://
rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/conferences.htm 
CONFLICT – WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT?
For indigenes, governments and developers 
in Papua New Guinea (PNG), the idea of 
a ‘community without conflict’ may be an 
objective which is neither socially imaginable 
nor even desired. Anthropologists, in particular, 
have long argued that disputes per se are 
not symptomatic of anomie. Social equilibriums 
are predicated on cyclic patterns of grievance 
management and are not perturbed by them. 
The legacy of anthropological research is the 
finding that all cultures possess a range of social 
control mechanisms for processing and settling 
disputes.1 Conflict and conflict resolution 
characterise all social organisations irrespective 
of their locale or level of development.2
These are salutary lessons for observers of 
dissension in places where attitudes towards 
emotionally and physically scarred landscapes 
might otherwise compel us to read ‘friction’ as 
‘failure’ – as a sign of a lack of rules sanctioned 
by judicial institutions or a reluctance to abide 
by them. Without engaging complex issues of 
‘false consciousness’ and the local rhetoric of 
declining law and order (see Gordon & Meggitt 
1985: 3), we should remain mindful that in 
the traditional stateless and acephalous societies 
of PNG, injunctions were rarely encoded in a 
formal corpus juris. Behavioural precepts were 
part of an undifferentiated class of ‘correct ways 
of interacting’ that were not dissected into the 
discrete categories of legal, social, religious or 
moral maxims. More often than not, norms were 
informally expressed through figurative genres 
of proverb or adage, they were often implicit 
in consensually arrived at resolutions and they 
were rarely objects of explicit litigation. This 
does not thereby allow us to infer that rules 
were ‘weakly’ held, applied or understood. There 
are no a-regulatory cultures, just as there are no 
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cultures that do not rely on ‘talk’ to express 
disagreement. The paradox of these universal 
truths is that while all languages have extensive 
vocabularies for wrangling, they reference such 
ubiquitous activity in ‘negative’ terms. Conflict 
is normal, but equally undesirable. Highlanders 
are agents of order but also disorder (cf. Gordon 
& Meggitt 1985: 13).
Observers often experience apathy when 
confronted with the cultural truism that fighting 
is both a recurrent and legitimate means of 
prosecuting claims or seeking restitution for 
many PNG societies.3 In what is loosely referred 
to as the ‘cultural logics’ of indigenous conflict 
systems (cf. Strathern 1993: 244), fighting forms 
part of a sequenced set of behavioural responses 
that may itself constitute a coda or precipitate 
closure. Attempts to gloss such commotion as 
part of an opposition between ‘war’ versus 
‘law’ have long been rejected as ethnocentric 
and over-simplistic. It is more useful to focus 
on understanding the patterns of recourse to 
different conflict resolution mechanisms and 
the prevalent sequential relationships between 
physical and verbal conflict (cf. Roberts 1979). 
We may thus pose two immediate questions:
• What is the relative efficacy, cost and 
desirability of recourse to state judicial 
processes as opposed to, or in tandem 
with, recourse to the exercise of power 
governed by ‘custom’? 
• What are the politico-economic and 
risk management strategies for talking and 
fighting? 
In formulating these questions we seek to 
clearly identify the range of conditions that 
drive or underpin perceptions of compliance 
or non-compliance behaviour when individuals 
operate within the pluralistic normative regimes 
of court and custom. 
Most often, these co-existent constraint 
systems are contrasted as an adjudicatory and 
hierarchical appellate system versus a system of 
egalitarian self-help regulation. We know that 
both the rule of law and custom provide scripts 
for the interaction between disputants in the 
Southern Highlands Province (SHP). We are 
less certain about why the cultural rationales 
underpinning law and custom continue to be 
in, and produce, conflict; that is, why cannot 
such formal and informal resolution regimes be 
mutually reinforcing agencies for stability in 
the Highlands context? After more than three 
decades of concerted think-tank activity, the 
problems of ‘law and order’ in PNG remain 
intractable.
Importantly, our understanding of 
commotion in SHP communities does not 
seem to be anchored to, or informed by, 
reliable statistical data on the urban or rural 
environments.4 Longitudinal research projects 
on the rate, scale and nature of conflict across 
the SHP are scarce. The resurgence of tribal 
fighting is taken as a sign of such conditions, 
but it remains unclear just how far down the 
social structure the increase in violence goes. 
Rather, what passes as ‘conventional wisdom’ is 
a gestalt, the configuration of findings drawn 
from the experiences of visitors and workers, 
from the feedback of local inhabitants5, from 
the discourse of PNG ‘law and order’ analysts6 
and from the impressions created by national 
and international media broadcasts on world-
wide trends and concerns in the Third World. 
These voices foreground the plight of PNG 
in terms of the prevalence of violence ‘out of 
control’. From one vantage point, there may be 
nothing specious about advocating a position 
that says, “What’s your problem? Conflict is 
custom”. However, such a position appears 
untenable for two reasons:
• Within the rapidly changing social 
environment of SHP, the nature, place 
and impact of conflict has changed; many 
of the circumstances which obtained in 
the pre-colonial era no longer prevail.
• In the view of all stakeholders, 
the stated goals of development and 
sustainability cannot be achieved without 
changes in the current regimes of conflict 
management and resolution.
The case for ‘intervention and prevention’ 
is not easily rebutted by modernist academic 
arguments concerning the hegemony of Western 
knowledge, the cultural relativity of ‘conflict 
paradigms’, or the constraints of problem-
solution prisms. In the SHP context, 
intervention therapy is very much a 
collaboratively constructed dialogue between 
indigenes and outsiders who are concerned to 
mitigate the adverse risks posed by changes 
in dispute practices. Perception is ‘reality’ 
and interventionism constitutes a key policy 
objective in contemporary indigenous 
knowledge frameworks.7
This paper explores the contours of social 
change with respect to the Huli people of the 
SHP. In the following sections I identify some of 
the key catalysts for ‘violence’ in the history of 
the region’s transformation and the options for 
settlement-directed activity discussed in other 
Provinces. Few analysts who have observed 
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were used to frame a dispute as between clan/
sub-clan x & y, though rarely did such units 
act in concert. Fight parties were usually an ad 
hoc conglomerate of allies drawn through the 
personal networks of a principal fight ‘owner’. 
Apart from the resort to physical violence, 
disputes were also prosecuted in public moots 
- informal gatherings of people to ‘share the 
talk’ on some issue. Agreements could be 
reached by consensus and through mediation. 
Lacking institutionalised authorities with power 
to impose judgements, it was not uncommon for 
claims to be aired in moots over a period of 
several months or even years.
To those unversed in the Huli cultural 
logic of revenge and redress (see Glasse 1959), 
the ‘pay-back’ system, the cycle of killing and 
counter-killing that can ramify from any breach 
of rights, may appear indiscriminate. But this 
would be to ignore the calculus of segmentary 
descent principles whereby the named clan 
section that ‘owned’ a fight was held corporately 
responsible for the actions of its members. 
Any descent unit member, kin or affine, 
could become a legitimate target for retributive 
homicides. Such actions were underwritten by 
the following mores: the belief that the spirit of 
a slain person would visit sickness on relatives 
who did not avenge a death10; the anger of 
relatives against a fight ‘owner’ who did not 
both avenge and compensate the death of an 
ally; descent unit pride at war prowess and the 
need to avoid public opprobrium and shame. 
The selection of particular individuals as pay-
back targets might be fortuitous - they came, 
they saw, they killed - or combine a number of 
rationales based on the previous litigious history 
between perpetrator, victim or victim’s group. 
Such opaque motivations allowed for multiple 
‘readings’ of deaths depending on the social 
circumstances of the reader. Warfare always 
involved temporary cessation of movements 
between people over territory and often, if large-
scale in nature, there would be migration of 
women and children to other parishes.
Where disputes developed into cyclic 
patterns of violence, this was followed by a 
prolonged period of inactivity during which 
third-parties might intervene to broker a 
settlement between groups. If the scale of 
the conflict was small, wergild (compensation) 
might be offered by one group to another. 
Equally, the conflicting groups might nominate 
a day to settle scores after which no claims 
for compensation would be pursued against 
the opposing fight owners. Most compensation 
payments were made to factions considered as 
allies. Internal dissension within a fight unit 
conflict in the Highlands over the last three 
decades would claim that there are simple 
solutions to be found. Not only may a one-
model-fits-all answer drown in a sea of culture-
specific conditions, the implementation and 
monitoring of solutions is also likely to tax 
the resources of stakeholders. Progress will 
then be pedestrian and it will depend, as we 
argue below, on achieving real change in the 
culture of mistrust, antipathy and opposition to 
Government agencies, authority and legitimacy. 
Unlock the mysteries of fostering ‘community’ 
social responsibility and participation (i.e. 
establishing community agency) and you begin 
to establish an effective interventionist system 
for conflict management.
CUSTOMARY DISPUTE 
MECHANISMS IN HULI
The Huli represent one of the major ethnic 
groups within the SHP and a microcosm of the 
factionalism8 that is endemic to both the region 
and the nation state of PNG. This population 
of approximately 100,000 people is divided into 
some 300-400 named patrilineal clan units, 
each of which is segmented into sub-clans and 
lineages. Satellite descent units of any clan may 
be dispersed across Huli territory, though usually 
each clan has a traditionally recognised locus of 
ritual and resource interests.
The Huli population now, as in the past, 
was formed by successive waves of in- and 
out-migration. Social mapping and genealogical 
data (cf. Goldman 1997-2002) have consistently 
shown that the margins of this population 
are inhabited by ‘naturalised’ Huli clans 
whose origins can be traced to neighbouring 
cultures such as the Duna, the Etolo, Kaluli, 
and Onabasulu from the Papuan Plateau 
(collectively referred to as Dugube by Huli), the 
lowland lake peoples such as the Foe and Fasu 
and Highland groups such as the Ipili and Wola. 
Even in the pre-colonial era Huli retained a 
heightened self-consciousness about their own 
tribal identity and divisions based on ‘ethnic 
origins’ (even for naturalised clans of several 
generations standing) were, and remain, well 
entrenched.9 
As elsewhere in the Highlands, there was no 
pre-colonial overarching system of governance. 
Each clan and clan section had a headman who 
was a repository of clan history and who lead 
groups in feuding, ritual and warfare. Headmen 
‘held the talk’ and intervened in disputes only 
as one voice amongst many. Descent unit names 
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often followed as claims for injury and death 
compensation were laid at the fight owner’s 
door. These structural strains might then result 
in new and more varied patterns of pay-back in 
the area.
The local understanding of conflict and 
conflict settlement is expressed in the language 
of ‘sickness’ and ‘healing’: disputes are like 
medical pathologies to which compensation 
is applied as a form of folk medicine.11 
‘Talk Never Dies’ precisely because between 
potential litigants there were always a number 
of issues that remained unresolved after talking 
or fighting. That is, many claims would lay 
dormant until such time as a strategically 
significant dispute arose allowing claimants 
to ‘activate’ past unresolved disputes in a 
sequenced set of claims. Disputes were always 
‘multiple-claim’ affairs. It was never the case 
that a “conflictless” set of conditions prevailed 
within any Huli community.
There are two important corollaries arising 
from the above discussion: 
• Conflict generation was more than 
an immediate reaction to some breach 
of someone’s rights or person. Litigants 
whose wealth stocks were depleted by 
compensation exchange might trigger any 
of a host of unresolved claims with 
other litigants to redress their depleted 
finances. Disputes were a structurally 
inherent and consequential by-product of 
a system of ‘talk-directed settlement’ that 
was unconstrained by the dictates of time.
• The onus for action and reaction 
was not delegated to, or usurped by, 
nominated agencies charged with 
monitoring adherence to rules and which 
might then intervene to restore ‘order’. 
This lack of centralisation meant 
resolution by consensus and mediation 
occurred through the exercise of 
individual discretion and self-regulatory 
mechanisms. Dialogue, rather than 
closure (Henton 2000: 586), was the 
processual essence of this system.
Huli fought about ‘land, women and pigs’.12 
They fought with bows and arrows, and with 
belief in the efficacy of toxic substances and 
sorcery. Importantly, the conflict system was 
uniform across the region; irrespective of locale, 
the types of disputes and the ways they were 
managed and resolved was the same from 
Margarima to Mogra-Fugua. As is indicated 
below, resource development projects in the 
region became catalysts for non-uniform, locale-
specific disputes and claims on benefit streams 
from outside of the region.
One of the factors driving traditional 
dispute resolution was a tacit understanding of 
the political and social-economic benefits of 
peaceful co-existence with resident others. 
Wars were most often fought with close 
neighbours with whom inter-marriage rates 
were high. Because one fought against those 
with whom one exchanged, third-party 
intervention through cross-cutting loyalties 
occurred. Moreover, personal reputations could 
be made and enhanced within these conflict 
cauldrons by speakers who employed rhetorical 
skills as “middle-men” to achieve consensus on 
dispute outcomes.
There were, however, other factors behind 
traditional dispute resolution which were more 
specifically associated with ‘compensation’ and 
these are still neglected in what passes for 
commonsense knowledge about Huli dispute 
processes. Notwithstanding the impression of 
lawlessness in Huli over the last decade, 
there is no persuasive evidence that cultural 
mores regarding compensation are being ignored 
or rejected. The continuing incidence and 
importance of compensatory exchange 
behaviour indicates the resilient vitality of 
‘custom’ governing inter-personal and inter-
group relationships.13 Paying compensation 
remains the conventionally oriented coda to 
conflict; it symbolises more than merely a 
rationale for pig husbandry or accumulation of 
wealth. Paying compensation:
• demonstrates both individual and 
corporate pride, as well as power, to acquit 
corporate social responsibility in a public 
forum; 
• addresses the risk of the ‘shame’ (cf. 
Epstein 1984) that might otherwise ensue, 
and which remains a forceful sanction in 
Melanesian culture;
• allows for other complex economic 
relationships of credit and debt (e.g., 
bride wealth, loans and land payments) 
to be entered into, or acquitted, through 
dispute resolution channels;
• provides closure on the specific issues 
that were the basis for the compensation 
claims.
• symbolically invokes and reaffirms both 
(a) peoples’ continuing membership of 
personal networks and social group statuses 
through exchange and consumption; and 
(b) the acceptance of norms of interaction 
that constitute the ‘cultural identity and 
ethnicity’ of the litigants; 
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• realises the obligations and 
responsibilities of people towards the 
‘health’ – both physical and psychological 
– of those ‘injured’ by their behaviour. 
Western enculturation often compels us to 
oppose talking and fighting. We express this in 
phrases such as ‘the time for talking is over’, 
‘action not words’, or ‘walk the talk’. In Huli 
bi (talk) and ba (fight) are not opposed in this 
way; they form analogous and continuous modes 
of dispute interaction. They do not therefore 
attract opposed moral valences (cf. Goldman 
1983 and Brison 1989). Factors driving the 
pursuance of claims through fighting include 
group reputation and group machismo. Arrows 
and argy-bargy are but two ways of prosecuting 
conflict and are part of a continuous series of 
options for dispute prosecution. Fighting and 
compensation are ceremonial events in which 
consciousness of the ‘system’ rules is heightened 
and re-affirmed by participants. These are the 
cultural scripts about how and why people exist 
as they do. Such public attestation of power 
and status - what people get out of fighting and 
compensating in the manner they do - has yet 
to be radically transformed by any social change 
movement. Huli fight and compensate as a ritual 
of deference to collective norms and societal 
values. Opting out is not an option unless one’s 
name and membership status is of no value. 
Power may flow from the barrel of a gun, 
but peace is financed from the banter of the 
garrulous.
There is nothing gratuitous about providing 
the above overview of customary dispute 
mechanisms in Huli. Historically informed 
understandings of these local dispute systems 
are needed because they remain vital and 
operational. Notwithstanding changes to 
governance structures (see below), the 
transformations wrought on dispute settlement 
were not so much ideological (involving 
fundamental transformations in beliefs and 
rationales) as idiomatic: the same things continue 
to be done for the same reasons, but through 
different channels, auspices or practices. In 
the move towards modernity, Huli communities 
became subject to new organisational and 
representational structures related to land, 
resources and the judiciary. Change meant 
an exponential growth in the overlapping 
organisational entities to which an individual 
belonged, but traditional patterns of cultural 
identity based on kinship and descent were not 
expunged. This made for the uneasy co-existence 
of custom and court at the very time when central 
government began to lose its core authority and 
legitimacy in the eyes of landowners.
CHANGING SOCIAL CONDITIONS
From the 1940s to the 1980s
Following first contact in the 1930s, the 
layers of administration created by a mechanistic 
colonial bureaucracy began to affect the 
traditional system of conflict management. 
This involved the establishment of district 
and regional governance, Local Government 
Councils (LGC) and the imposition of: a 
multi-tiered system of state constituted courts 
following the 1962 Derham Report (see Figure 
1); a Village Court system following the 1973 
Village Courts Act; and other administrative 
agencies such as the Village Councillor system. 
In addition to this forensic edifice, disputes were 
also taken to, settled by, or sought to involve, 
mission workers, administrative agents such as 
kiaps or police contingents from Koroba, Tari or 
Komo.
This period saw the erosion of the localised 
insularity of a people who had for millennia 
relied on indigenous, grass-roots generated 
institutions of grievance management. The 
increasing exposure of Huli to outside agencies, 
imported technologies, structures of political 
representation and non-traditional lifestyles was 
buttressed by: 
• an increase in tourism related activities 
in the SHP;
• the provincial management of district 
policy and public works programs in 
health, education and communications;
• the assimilation of cash and cash 
economy goods;
• and the gradual impact of increased 
access to education on the aspirations 
of youth who became dissatisfied with 
a subsistence agriculture lifestyle and 
sought employment opportunities in 
Hagen, Lae, Moresby and elsewhere.
There is good evidence to suggest that during 
this first-wave period in which the colonial 
presence became consolidated, the various ‘court’ 
systems imposed a quantum of fines and penalties 
that was quite at odds with custom. The 
short-term impact was to increase the level of 
litigation as disputants relied on the activation 
of pending claims latent in the customary 
conflict system to redress wealth imbalances. 
Elsewhere, non-customary impositions of 
homicidal compensation as ‘penalties’ merely 
exacerbated levels of inter-group conflict.
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Figure 1 National Judicial System (Chalmers & Paliwala 1977: 94)
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agencies were never welcomed as integral parts 
of people’s lives. Having been engendered 
without collaborative debate and imposed 
without proper education campaigns, they 
induced apathy and antipathy. They were 
conveniences of, and for, an alienated cabal of 
decision-makers.
The downward spiral in social order – 
after some initial development successes in the 
1960s-70s – was precipitated by a conjunction 
of factors that laid the ground conditions for 
inequality, frustration, and pedestrian progress. 
On the one hand, landowners had unfilled, 
but exaggerated, expectations; on the other 
hand, landowners could rightly point to their 
disappointments with unsustainable agricultural 
and small business (e.g. trade store) projects. 
We witnessed the “declining effectiveness of 
courts, the police and other law-enforcement 
agencies of the central government” (Gordon 
& Meggitt 1985: 247). What emerged was a 
newfound fervour for the pursuit of reparations 
through new claim types - road, vehicle 
and work related injuries - and even larger 
war compensation demands resulting from 
increased inter-ethnic communication and 
contact. Government infrastructure like schools, 
aid-posts, hospitals, and district offices became 
legitimate targets of vandalism in conflict 
or political related disenchantment. Prison 
sentences failed to stem the tide of disorder 
largely because incarceration lacks the stigmatic 
deterrent value found in Western cultures.
There are some systemic environmental 
conditions (both social and physical) that have 
constrained development progress in Huli, and 
which we identify as follows:
• The residential settlement pattern 
is one of scattered households, not 
nucleated village settlements. For 100,000 
people distributed over often inhospitable 
territory, the reticulation of water, 
electricity and sanitation is problematic 
in the extreme. With extensive 
settlement change unlikely in the short 
term, the twin tyrannies of distance 
and distribution remain obstacles to 
development.
• With the exception of those roads close 
to resource developments, only the main 
trunk highways have sealed surfaces and 
remain useable most of the time. In times 
of conflict, these arterial links may be 
closed by warring factions, or used by 
local landowners in road blocks to extort 
money.
The lesson to be drawn from this period 
of response to ‘law and order’ is that 
interventionist activities can often be a catalyst 
for increased levels of the very activity they 
attempt to address. The whole ‘court’ system 
became a larger referral network for dispute 
processing and an alternative avenue of recourse 
when customary talking failed to produce a 
desired outcome. Risk management strategies 
weighed up distance, time, cost, and effort. 
At the same time, levels of frustration with 
the ‘courts’ rose because of two quite alien 
administrative conventions: (1) the distinction 
courts maintained between civil and criminal 
cases which often confused litigants; and 
(2) interrogative procedures which aimed to 
disentangle claim issues and produce a single 
definition of a wrong or breach against which a 
reparation calculus or penalty might be applied. 
This procedure was foreign to ‘custom’ in which 
litigants sought to ‘entangle’ issues in sequential 
chains of causation to reveal the “source, base, 
bone, root” event and where compensation 
might subsume multiple issues between the 
litigants. For Huli, case prosecution became 
an alienating experience, often resulting in 
frustration that parts of the multiple-claim web 
not dealt with in the courts then had to be 
pursued as separate, rather than aggregated, 
issues. Under these conditions, state ‘law’ began 
to lose social acceptance.
In these decades of assimilation, 
accommodation and adaptation to change, the 
profoundly politicised agendas associated with 
national governance had a significant impact on 
inter-group behaviour. Politics was viewed as a 
new theatre of competition for acquiring benefit 
streams. This was politics as patronage and this 
world-view lacked any embedded concept of ‘for 
the community good’. Rather, politics became 
subject to localised maximizing strategies: (a) 
secure a position (for oneself or related other) 
as a member; (b) ensure one had a ‘wantok’ 
as an elected representative; (c) invoke and 
rework regional myths of origins to create new 
provinces as smaller self-interested distributional 
pies. Fuelled by the belief that national 
government was corrupt and inefficient (a 
belief underscored by continual revelations and 
rumours) governance came to lack credibility 
in the eyes of the grass-roots populaces in the 
Highlands. Equally, it has to be acknowledged 
that there were no predisposing cultural 
conditions for landowners to become ‘team 
players’ in nation building. Simply expressed, 
there was no community agency for social 
advancement. Politico-legal infrastructures and 
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• Business ventures (cattle, coffee, crops, 
silkworms, etc) have proved 
unsustainable due to: the transport 
and communication problems alluded 
to above; lack of understanding about 
investment and replenishment strategies; 
competition by start-up trade stores 
which attract customers on a ‘same 
descent unit’ basis; and profit erosion 
through customary exchange activities or 
debit-credit relationships.
• The virtual absence of any local 
business employment other than small 
trade activities in Tari, Koroba and Komo. 
This remains particularly marked in non-
project areas. Project benefits attained by 
the new ‘Huli haves’ rankle with the 
relatively disadvantaged ‘have-nots’.
• Expenditure patterns reveal an 
inexorable and inexhaustible 
consumerism. Disposable incomes are 
dissipated on consumer goods for which 
there is no repair or maintenance 
infrastructure. Purchased goods quickly 
become unserviceable. This in turn drives 
the need for replacement expenditure.
• For that small percentage of Huli who 
bucked these trends, the options were 
very limited. The accumulation of wealth 
for its own sake was not yet valued 
and the traditional expectation that 
wealth would be distributed forced many 
skilled migrants to remain ‘outsiders’ for 
extended periods.
In effect the vast majority of the rural 
population saw themselves trapped between, 
on the one hand, their inability to extricate 
themselves from dependence on subsistence 
horticulture and, on the other hand, the drive 
to acquire money to purchase cash economy 
goods and satisfy other needs. Income windfalls 
were transient and made little substantial or 
sustainable difference to their lives. In the 
context of an increasingly alienated political 
and governance machinery, the rule of ‘conflict 
custom’ remained the cornerstone for the redress 
of grievances. 
From the 1980s to 2000
Up until the late 1980s, the geometry 
of social group formation and custom, the 
infrastructure of ties between descent groups and 
land, remained largely intact and to a degree 
impervious to these sweeping transformations. 
But this was now a system whose ethical 
underpinnings and familial control mechanisms 
had long dissipated. Elsewhere, the waning of 
the men’s long-house tradition and increased 
rates of male-female co-residence had similar 
effects.
The contexts (e.g. magic, ritual, warfare) 
in which traditional leaders operated no longer 
obtained or had been dramatically altered. Many 
of the older incumbents of ‘headman’ status 
lacked education in, or knowledge of, pidgin/
English. Where their representative functions 
were needed, especially in resource development 
areas, they were usurped by, or their powers were 
devolved to, younger literate males. As large 
contingents of Huli became semi-permanently 
resident in Port Moresby, discontinuities in 
the voices of representation began to emerge 
between grass-roots and migrant community 
members.
The cessation of most religious fertility cults, 
including the Bachelor cult, during the 1960s 
meant that the institutionalised inculcation of 
conventional Huli mores was left solely to 
religious, school or family agencies. But these 
belief systems had long been challenged by 
imported ideologies, producing a society with 
co-existent but plural moral codes. This non-
uniformity and breakdown in low-level family 
control created the conditions for a more 
nucleated outlook on strategies to maximise 
income streams well before the onset of resource 
development.
Policing became impossible outside the 
restricted zones of influence adjacent to the 
small police forces in Tari, Koroba and Komo. 
Resources were simply inadequate for both the 
size of population and their dispersed settlement. 
In this respect one notes the police:populace 
ratios of Australia 1: 439; NZ 1: 692; and 
PNG 1: 1000. For Huli, it is unlikely the 
ratio ever reached 1:1000. Irrespective of these 
resource statistics, this was in any case a rapidly 
transformed theatre of conflict.
• The widespread importation of firearms 
and firearm technology meant that the 
sanction of force was not easily applied 
(most males over 18 had their own 
shotguns).
• New forms of injury were being 
perpetrated (including maiming and rape) 
and new practices such as kidnapping and 
ransom (as in Koroba-Kopiago election of 
2002) were adopted.14
• Inter-tribal conflicts escalated in 
number, frequency and death counts. The 
scale of conflict rendered police impotent 
much of the time.
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• The phenomenon of ‘rascal gangs’ that 
were mobile, armed, and transient posed 
insurmountable problems for policing.
By the 1990s the ineffectiveness of the 
court system had become apparent. There 
were staggering rates of acquittal, dismissed 
cases, adjournments and not-guilty verdicts. 
The appeals system (within the context of 
an under-resourced judiciary) only strengthened 
public opinion that litigation was a form 
of gamesmanship, another arena for ‘talking’ 
that bred contempt. Huli became adept at 
marshalling their own ‘evidence’ including 
Government reports that fell off the back 
of proverbial truck, using Huli lawyers and 
legal students, and even attempting to co-opt 
anthropologists. 
The Resource Development Cauldron
The developments at Kare, Porgera, Hides, 
Kutubu, Mananda and Moran established SHP 
as a resource-rich province. For many Huli, 
this fulfilled traditional cargo-cult prophecies 
and their understandings of sacred landscapes. 
But the accelerated pace of transformation with 
respect to infrastructure development, business 
training and development, roads, and general 
wealth creation were seen to be unevenly 
spread.
Localised distribution of resource benefit 
streams became a source of frustration and 
division at both intra and inter-ethnic levels. 
Outsiders saw themselves as rural spokes to 
advantaged hubs of ‘elite’ village bases that 
garnered newfound reputations for inequity. 
In-migration to these mini-centres of wealth 
occurred with a consequential increase in 
levels of crime. Local governments were viewed 
as lining their own pockets by negotiating 
favourable landowner deals.
To accommodate modernity, the 
communities affected by development projects 
have been subjected to new organisational 
and representational structures. They have 
become members of Incorporated Land Groups, 
Landowner companies, Landowners 
Associations, Village Development Committees 
and Local Level Government wards (following 
the 1997 Organic Law on Provincial 
Government) as well as Petroleum Prospecting 
License (PPL) and Petroleum Development 
License (PDL) status groups. Because many 
of these schemes concern only localised 
areas (i.e. they are often facilitated by 
developers in specific project areas) non-
participant communities feel disadvantaged. 
Equally, the new entities are bedevilled by 
the problems that afflict all governance 
institutions: inadequate resources, insufficiently 
trained personnel and a constituency of 
‘members’ who do not accept or appreciate the 
ideology of ‘for the good of the community’. 
It is not simply that such entities become 
unsustainable or unworkable under their guiding 
mandates, but that their constituencies treat 
them as new forums for pursuing politico-
economic strategies. As is explained more fully 
below, they become colonised by Huli custom. 
Within the project areas, decision-making 
was often concentrated in the hands of a 
few individuals or organisations that were 
frequently less than transparent in their 
communications with grass roots members. 
This allowed certain individuals to amass and 
manipulate large wealth and political control, 
inducing divisiveness within communities.
Landowners continued to regard themselves 
as competitors against Government for benefit 
streams through control of, and access to, their 
sub-surface resources. Equity, royalty, roads and 
infrastructure became the new battlegrounds. In 
this enterprise, politics was the means whereby 
they could influence outcomes by ensuring ‘one 
of us’ was in the Mendi lodge.
The argument made here is that a critical 
combination of social and economic conditions 
contributed to the deterioration of ‘law and 
order’ across the SHP. Whilst custom and court 
continue to operate in a coterminous fashion 
across the region, the efflorescence and vitality 
of custom is in direct proportion to the waning 
efficacy of the state judicature. This finding 
partly answers our initial question about the 
relative recourse to state as opposed to locally 
engendered dispute resolution mechanisms. The 
efficiency with which Huli continue to colonise 
and assimilate these new institutions renders 
them but new theatres for political strategists. 
In the context of the environmental conditions 
described above, it is little surprise that the 
Village Court system also fell prey to suspicions 
of corruption, manipulation and the failure 
of the magistrates to adequately supervise its 
administration.
WHERE WILL THE SOLUTIONS 
COME FROM? 
It is pertinent to remind ourselves that 
despite numerous commissions of enquiry since 
the early 1970s, the introduction of Village 
Courts, States of Emergency, and various 
development oriented governance initiatives 
Goldman 03 17/12/03, 12:11 PM8-9
  State, Society and Governance in Melanesia
10
and reforms, few inroads have been made into 
the continuing deterioration in law and order 
conditions. Even the most cursory review of 
the burgeoning literature on Highlands ‘law and 
order’ problems yields an intimidating set of ‘I 
know why and we ought to’ recommendations. 
Causal analyses have linked the resurgence of 
violence to globalisation, ethnicity and identity 
movements, dependency and inequality as well 
asocial frustration. Anthropologists have mused 
about conflict in acephalous cultures with 
floating hierarchies of prestige.15 Some of the 
proposed solutions16 include:
• the removal of state law and sole 
reliance on custom;
• a ‘glass windows’ approach involving 
unprecedented levels of support for court 
institutions and the imposition of group 
fines (see Paney report);
• and the reintroduction of the kiap system.
There are also a number of top-down 
solutions:
National solutions
Few would disagree that the nation state in 
PNG presents as unstable, with an impoverished 
infrastructure and capacity to service its 
constituencies. This fuels the widespread 
perception that the state is inefficient and 
corrupt. At the very least there has been 
unmitigating erosion of partnership ideals 
and there is little appreciation that the 
state is a ‘nurturing’ organisation. Given the 
present circumstances, the inculcation and 
embedding of a ‘theory of social formation and 
responsibilities’ can only realistically evolve over 
the long-term.
Provincial solutions
The devolution of control and decision-
making to Provinces, and more recently to 
LLGs, was an attempt to address the tyrannies of 
distance and distribution alluded to previously. 
The scheme suffers, however, from the problems 
of general administrative decline:
• The theft or destruction of computers, 
vehicles and office equipment by successive 
administrations has weakened provincial 
infrastructures.
• Accusations have been made about 
the large-scale misappropriation of funds and 
irregularities in contract regulation and 
tendering processes.
• Provincial planners do not have the 
support of a research culture in which ‘needs’ 
based project inputs are part of decision-making 
processes.
• Infrastructure development since the 1990s 
has created high levels of provincial resource 
project dependency through tax credit schemes, 
etc. For 1993-2000, CNGL, as operators for the 
Joint Venture Partners, spent US$20,000,0000 
in the SHP alone. In 1997, oil revenue 
contributed to 41% of the total provincial 
budget in SHP. Both SHP and Gulf Provinces 
are dependant on national government grants 
and oil revenue to cover recurrent and 
development expenditure. 
• Government data indicates that the 
provision of health and education services 
declined in the very years that the income of the 
SHP was at its highest level. National health 
statistics for Nipa-Kutubu District show that, 
by comparison with other provincial districts 
and PNG median rates, Kutubuans have lower 
than expected access to Health Extension 
Officers, communications and family planning. 
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Immunisation levels dropped significantly in 
the period 1995-8 to less than 30% of 1995 
levels. Diagram 1 (above), drawn from the 
2002 SEIS for Kutubu-Gobe (Goldman 2002), 
assessed six health service indicators: clinical 
visits, Community Health Workers and Aid Post 
Orderlies, communications, refrigerators, triple 
antigen cover and monthly reporting rates for 
a three-year period. The same scenarios are 
applicable across the region.
Clearly, the problems of governance and 
the administration of social services are not 
necessarily related to the presence or absence of 
resource development.
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES
Given that in this paper we can provide 
no more than an opening onto the kinds of 
‘interventionist therapies’ required to address 
the problems outlined above, we offer the 
following set of recommendations: 
• Micro-management at new 
‘community’ levels to foster community 
agency and self-management in the 
process of development.
• Institutional strengthening of the 
present ‘court’ system by wider 
distribution of judicial functions to 
provide greater accessibility, presence and 
effective intervention. 
• Increased police presence with specific 
interventionist agendas at the outbreak 
of violence and more effective policing 
of gun use and possession through the 
implementation of group fines.
• Increased business training in non-
project areas focused on the development 
of maintenance and repair small trade 
initiatives.
It is our contention that, for all the 
reasons given above, custom will offer attractive 
avenues for conflict management while state 
legal institutions and administration continue to 
be weakened and undermined by ‘image’ issues. 
In the short-to-medium term, one must seek an 
accommodation and balance between court and 
custom by establishing fire-walls to uncontrolled 
fighting. Triadic conflict settlement based on 
tradition is effective, is indulged in by the 
populace, and is continuous with established 
mores. The wholesale reinvention of indigenous 
grievance management processes for Huli would 
be akin to showing a professional golfer how to 
hold a golf club. What is required is control at 
the margins of the system.
The reliance on custom is in part due 
to the success of Huli in their indigenisation 
of state legal control (cf. Weisbrot et al 
1982). This upward colonisation is manifest 
in the Village Courts and other institutions 
(though, paradoxically, the Village Courts 
initially imitated the style and penalties of 
District and Local Court magistrates). For there 
to be any change in the recourse strategies of 
litigants, there would need to be a uniform, 
widespread and simultaneous change in the 
clan descent system, use of wealth patterns, 
and economic subsistence bases. It is likely 
that transformation will most successfully occur 
without the forceful imposition of conflict 
resolution regimes. Without unilateral 
disarmament, any increased use of legitimate 
violence by the state will meet with antipathy 
and will be forcefully rebuffed by the populace. 
Institutional strengthening of the court 
system is required, but in a much different form 
to that which has previously obtained. It may 
be that the new LLG wards can service the 
development needs of ‘community agencies’. But 
whatever demarcation of social units is deemed 
appropriate, there needs to be more courts and 
more police to support the legal and executive 
functions. As we have noted previously, changes 
to the residential settlement pattern will not 
occur in the short-to-medium term precisely 
because the land tenure system will not itself 
undergo dramatic transformation. To develop 
corporate approaches to community wellbeing 
for Huli, an appropriate level of administrative 
zone has to be selected. 
Micro-management in community 
development will most successfully occur in the 
short-term within the resource project areas. In 
effect, these will provide the kinds of modelling 
and scaffolding precedents that can be adopted 
by the rest of the region - if only because 
resources are available for such initiatives. 
The significance of establishing ‘model’ 
communities as incentives for change cannot be 
underestimated. At the same time, the success 
of engendering community agency will depend 
on how far one is able to educate landowners 
on the responsibilities of self-empowerment and 
control. Drawing again from the recent Kutubu 
SEIS, when asked about the provision of better 
services in the area 74% of respondents indicated 
that they felt this was the duty of the developer; 
only 26% identified their community as having 
any responsibility for development priorities.
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While there are no simple solutions for 
sustainable development, especially where the 
infrastructure to support a market economy 
is still underdeveloped, more can be done 
to encourage minor training and business 
ventures in non-project areas. This culture of 
consumerism requires small trade businesses in 
repair and maintenance. Extension of training 
opportunities to non-project areas will go some 
way towards alleviating impressions of relative 
deprivation.
Perhaps the hardest task of all will be to 
overcome distrust of, and disrespect for, all forms 
of state governance which is seen as a cannibal 
of landowner protein. The baggage of the wantok 
system and endemic factionalism cannot be 
overridden by minor successes on the front of 
social progress. This is why any faith placed in 
the judiciary as a source of control is misplaced 
and ill conceived. Furthermore, no amount of 
well intentioned psychotherapy via the medium 
of managed development will independently 
halt the upward colonising tendencies of Huli. 
Whilst politics is perceived as patronage rather 
than as a participatory endeavour, the court 
system will continue to be subverted. Top-down 
role models may be one answer to these ‘image’ 
problems.
Laurence Goldman, May 2003
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ENDNOTES
1   In PNG, these mechanisms range from informal 
moots to court-like institutions and may include: 
the competitive channeling of opposition through 
forms of exchange; retributive practices including 
physical violence, witchcraft and sorcery; shame 
and public opprobrium through harangue or public/
private announcement protocols; withdrawal and 
avoidance; and compensation.
2   These understandings are implicit in much of 
the literature on ‘law and order’ in PNG. Cf. 
Fitzpatrick (1980, 1982), Paliwala (1982), and 
Strathern (1993). 
3   Cf. MacIndoe (1981) for similar sentiments about 
Simbu.
4   Gordon & Meggitt alluded to similar problems in 
Enga in their sub-section on ‘The Problem in and 
of statistics’ (1985: 19-24). See also the findings 
of the Paney Report (1973) - The Committee to 
Investigate Tribal Fighting in the Highlands.
5   The SEIS for Kutubu-Gobe (Goldman, Kameata & 
Brooksbank 2002) noted that 79.5% of respondents 
felt that ‘law and order’ problems had increased 
in the project impacted areas. 44% of respondents 
stated they thought it was resource project related, 
but 56% felt that it was only partially or not at all 
related to the inception of resource project - that 
in effect other drivers and social conditions were 
responsible for deterioration in ‘law and order’.
6   The phrase is understood to refer to levels 
of conformity to criminal law prescriptions about 
violence, theft, disturbance of peace, and the firm 
administration of penalties for breach.
7   While this may not be reflected in any developed 
critical indigenous scholarship, it does subsist at the 
level of commonly agreed world-views. 
8   This phrase glosses the conditions of widespread 
and embedded fears, mistrust and security concerns 
within and between groups.
9   In the Hides area, this manifested itself during 
the 1990s in a major land dispute between Huli 
vs Dugube, even though paradoxically the Dugube 
in question were all long-term naturalised and 
resident Huli. Similar ‘ethno-theories of ethnicity’ 
are reflected in the mythical and ideological 
foundations of the Hela political movement which 
seeks to create a new Province from ‘common 
origin’ landowners.
10  Similar findings have been made by Sillitoe (1981) 
for the Wola of the SHP.
11  I have argued elsewhere (Goldman 1983) that the 
Huli nomenclature for compensation pigs encodes 
a folk medicine, just as the term ‘compensation’ 
in Huli is etymologically derived from the term ‘to 
make/get well’. 
12  Claims most typically included pig damage, illicit 
sex, homicide, debts, theft, compensation, land, 
insult, poisoning, trespass, bridewealth, custody, and 
sorcery.
13  There appear major differences here between Huli, 
and Melpa or Engan practices as described by Feil 
(1979) and Gordon & Meggitt (1985). Engans 
manipulated stereotyped ideas of compensation to 
exploit baim bodi homicide compensations. In Huli, 
to the contrary, there is no evidence that traditional 
payment categories have been subverted by new 
exigencies in the social environment. 
14  Although the rules of fighting and engagement 
appear, as in Enga (see Gordon & Meggitt 1985: 
154), to have remained much the same.
15  Strathern (1977) identifies the combination of (a) 
high population density; (b) large political units; (c) 
avid response to economic development; and (d) 
aspects to group dynamics as structural conditions 
for warfare in the region.
16  See Gordon & Meggitt (1985) for an overview of 
these suggestions.
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